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New evidence of the effect of transaction costs on residential mobility 
 
Abstract.  Transaction costs have attracted considerably attention in the theoretical literature 
on residential mobility. In many European countries, these costs mainly consist of ad-valorem 
transaction costs. In the current paper, we demonstrate empirically for the Netherlands that the 
transaction costs have a strong negative effect on the owners’ probability of moving. Under a 
range of different specifications, it appears that a one percent-point increase in the value of 
transaction costs - as a percentage of the value of the residence - decreases ownership to 
ownership residential mobility rates by eight percent. The estimates imply that ownership to 
ownership mobility rates would be 50 percent higher in the absence of the current six percent 
ad-valorem buyer transaction tax. Our estimates are consistent with the observation that in the 
Netherlands ad-valorem transaction costs mainly consist of buyer transaction costs.  
JEL:R200, C410, D190; keywords: moving costs, residential mobility and transaction taxes 
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1. Introduction  
Theoretical and empirical studies have shown that transaction costs in the housing 
market may create lock-in effects.1 The negative welfare effects of transaction costs are 
thought to be substantial, due to sub-optimal consumption of housing (O’Sullivan et al., 
1995), a reduction in job mobility and potentially increasing unemployment (Oswald, 1997, 
1999, Van Ommeren et al., 2000). These transaction costs include transaction taxes, such as 
capital gains taxes and ad-valorem taxes which are proportional to the house value (e.g. stamp 
duties and sales taxes). Buyer ad-valorem taxes are common in the OECD housing market. In 
most OECD countries, purchasers of residential homes have to pay registration taxes, so-
called stamp duties, which are essentially ad-valorem buyer taxes ranging from 0 and 12 
percent (Robinson, 1988). For example, in the Netherlands, the buyer has to pay a tax equal to 
6% of the value of the property. In addition to ad-valorem taxes, purchasers usually pay 
brokerage fees, mortgage fees and recording fees (solicitor). These fees are also 36 
proportional to the property value. They typically amount to 4 to 6 percent of the property 
value. The total monetary transaction costs (the sum of the taxes and the fees) in the 
Netherlands are about 12 percent of the property value, approximately 50 percent of average 
net annual income (OECD, 1999). As far as we are aware, no empirical evidence on the size 
of the lock-in effects of ad-valorem costs / taxes has been provided. 2 
Despite the lack of evidence on the lock-in effect of ad-valorem transaction costs, 
information on average residential mobility rates of owners and ad-valorem transaction costs 
of European countries suggests a strong negative effect of these costs on residential mobility 
(see Appendix 1). For example, in the United Kingdom, transaction costs are much lower, and 
residential mobility rates are much higher than in other European countries. However, 
transaction costs mainly consist of tax rates which are set by national governments, 
conditional on the average residential mobility rate, so the causal relationship between 
transaction costs and residential mobility cannot be easily investigated using aggregate 
information.  
The current paper aims to estimate the effect of transaction costs on residential 
mobility using micro-economic data. We are able to identify the effect of transaction costs on 
owners' residential mobility by using information on the effect of the property value on the 
propensity to move to ownership and the propensity to move to renting.  
                                                           
1
 Weinberg et al., 1981; Venti and Wise, 1989; Rouwendal and Meijer, 2001. 
2
 Lundberg and Skedinger (1999) provide evidence regarding the effects of capital gains taxes for Sweden. 
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The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the theoretical 
considerations to estimate the effect of transaction costs on residential mobility of owners 
employing information on the relationship between the property value and residential 
mobility. In Sections 3 and 4, the statistical model and the data are introduced. In Section 5, 
we present and interpret the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theory  
2.1 Basic Model 
 Following the literature on the optimal number of residential moves (e.g. Amundsen, 
1985; Englund, 1985; Hardman and Ioannides, 1985), we assume that a residential move is 
not initiated by abrupt changes of any kind, but is the result of long-term consumption 
planning, based on evaluations of permanent income, anticipated changes in household 
composition, etc. So, we assume that households have perfect foresight. We follow the 
literature by assuming the existence of moving costs. Given the household’s income, the price 
of housing services and other goods, the household’s objective is to determine the optimal 
residence duration and the optimal consumption of housing services (and other goods). One of 
the main results in the literature on the optimal number of moves is that the optimal residence 
duration depends positively on the moving costs. Moreover, the residence duration does not 
depend on the consumption of housing services, because both have been optimally chosen 
(Amundsen, 1985). Because residence duration is inversely related to the probability of 
moving residence, it follows that the probability of moving residence, P, depends negatively 
on the moving costs m and does not depend directly on the property value, V. So: 
 
 
The above result can be readily extended with the introduction of tenure, so 
households may choose between renting and ownership. Because the residence duration is 
optimally chosen, the probability of moving residence does not depend on the value of the 
residence. So: 
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where the superscript i (i=o,r) denotes whether the household moves to ownership or to 
renting. 
Let us now focus on owners and let us distinguish between different components of 
moving costs. In case of a move to renting, total moving costs, mr, consist of a fixed 
component and a component which varies with the value of the current residence, because of 
costs associated with selling (mainly estate agent costs): 
 
0, >+= βαβα Vmr ,                                                                                                         (2) 
 
where α captures the fixed non-monetary and monetary costs of moving costs of moving 
residence. 3 In the current study, we initially fix the value of β. This value has been obtained 
by noting that most households sell their residences via estate agents and that in the 
Netherlands the market for real estate agents is highly regulated. In the Netherlands, the 
organisation for real estate agents set the estate agent costs at 1.85% -2.0% of the value of the 
property sold.4 Moving house involves a few other costs that are related to the size of the 
property and therefore to property value (e.g. transportation costs), so initially we fix β to 
3.0%. Later on, we will estimate β.  
 In case of a move to ownership, the transaction costs, mo, encompass the costs paid by 
households which move to renting and the buyer costs, which are proportional to the value of 
the next residence: 
 
where VN denotes the value of the next residence. The assumption of perfect foresight implies 
that the value of VN is known to the household. Buyer costs in the Netherlands involve taxes 
(6%), estate agent costs (1.85-2.0%), registration costs and, usually, mortgage and valuer’s 
fees. So, the buyer costs typically vary between 8 and 10%. In the current study, we will 
initially fix γ to 9%, but we will also estimate γ (relative to β). Note that VN is only observed 
for a sample of households which move during the period of observation. We make therefore 
use of the relationship between VN and V, and estimate this relationship using observations 
for which VN is observed. We suppose a linear relationship between VN and V: 
 
                                                           
3
 Van Vuuren (2002) estimates α and obtains large values for α in the Netherlands. 
4
 Only recently, in 2001, this practice has been outlawed. 
(3)         0,,,                                                                                   mo >++= γβαγβα NVV
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where ε is random error. 5Combining the last two equations, we obtain the following relation 
between mo and V: 
 
Recall that the theoretical model implies that V has no direct effect on Po and Pr. Equations  
(2) and (5) imply that: 
 
 
It follows that: 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
The values of odP /dV and rdP /dV will be estimated given information on residential moving 
behaviour and the value of the residence. Hence, given information on the values of β and γ 
and estimates of η (which can be estimated given information on VN and V), we are able to 
identify the marginal effect of moving costs on residential mobility.  
 
One empirical difficulty is that in the Netherlands the value for β is small, which makes the 
estimate of rP∂ /∂m extremely sensitive to assumptions on β. For example, the assumption 
                                                           
5
 One expects that δ > 0 and 0 < η < 1, because households tend to increase the consumption of housing services 
at the beginning and tend to decrease this consumption at the end of their housing career (e.g. Amundsen, 1985). 
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that β obtains values between 2% and 3%, implies that it varies by a factor of 1.5 due to 
uncertainty about the value of β. Note further that if households perceive β to be close to zero, 
then this implies that rdP /dV = 0, so our estimation procedure cannot identify rdP /dm. In 
conclusion, estimates of oP∂ /∂m are plausibly more reliable than estimates of rP∂ /∂m, since 
the latter are very sensitive to values of β. When β approaches zero, rP∂ /∂m is not identified. 
To overcome this empirical difficulty, we will also attempt to estimate β.  
 
2.2 Estimating β 
 Up to now, we have assumed that β and γ are known. Another attempt is to estimate β 
relative to γ, by imposing stronger behavioural assumptions. We will suppose that: 
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This assumption, which we will test, implies that the marginal effect of the moving costs on 
mobility to ownership is equal to the effect on mobility to renting.6 This assumption is in line 
with previous empirical studies that estimate the effect of moving costs on residential mobility 
(Lundborg and Skedinger, 1998; Venti and Wise, 1984). Using equations (7), (8) and (9), it 
appears that: 
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So, we are able to identify the ratio of β to γ, but not β and γ separately. Given information on 
γ, one does not need any information on β. Alternatively, when one has information on the 
sum of β and γ (the total ad-valorem tranaction costs), one can estimate both β and γ.  
 
                                                           
6
 Studies for the United States indicate that this assumption may be inaccurate (e.g. Haurin and Grill, 2002), 
because an increase in moving costs may be positively related to an increase in future moving costs which 
decreases expected residential mobility. A decrease in expected residential mobility makes owning relatively 
more attractive (Boehm, 1981). For the Netherlands, this assumption is thought to be more accurate because the 
difference in residential mobility rates of owners and renters is much smaller in the Netherlands than in the 
United States. Moreover, the correlation between current and future moving costs may be moderate. 
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2.3 Relaxing the assumption of perfect foresight 
 The assumption of perfect foresight implies that the probability of moving does not 
depend directly on the value of the residence. This assumption may not always hold. For 
example, households may not foresee abrupt changes in relevant factors such as income, 
household composition, interest rates and house prices etc (see Quigley, 1987). One may 
argue of course that households are perfectly rational in an uncertain environment (e.g. Haurin 
and Grill, 1987), so, on average, given risk neutrality the value of the residence should have 
no effect on the probability of moving. We prefer however to make a less restrictive 
assumption and will assume that the value of the residence directly influences residential 
mobility. Such an assumption allows for example for the possibility that, given uncertainty 
about future income, risk averse households initially consume less housing services than 
desired in the absence of uncertainty. At the moment that the household receives more 
information on future income, the household will, on average, consume more housing 
services, which suggests a direct negative effect of V. So, we will relax equation (1) by 
assuming:  
 
We make now the assumption that rP∂ /∂V= oP∂ /∂V. This assumption can be justified by 
noting that the value of the current residence should not determine the choice of the next 
residence type of tenure (conditional on income, savings, housing services, preferences, etc.). 
Further, we maintain the assumption that rP∂ /∂m= oP∂ /∂m. 
 
Given these assumptions, we obtain again equation (10) and (11). For convenience, we have 
summarised the assumptions and the theoretical effect of moving costs on the probability of 
moving residence in Table 1. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 1 over here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Following the literature, we have presumed that a moving household chooses the type of 
tenure (ownership or renting) optimally.  Although this assumption may be realistic for most 
moves, this assumption may be inaccurate for some households. For example, in the United 
States households that sell their residence and migrate to another region may fail to find in 
time a residence which offers the desired housing consumption, and move temporarily to 
renting. In this case, households move to renting anticipating to pay buyer costs in the near 
future, so buyer costs will have a negative effect on moves to renting. Such an example is, 
however less plausible for the Netherlands, because of the geographical size of the country. 
Migration over long distances is absent in the Netherlands, and households are therefore 
informed about local housing markets. 
         Furthermore, we have assumed that households choose the residence duration optimally 
taking moving costs into account. Although this may be true for most households, it is likely 
that when a divorce is the main reason for moving, a move may become ‘forced’ and moving 
costs may become irrelevant for the probability of moving.7 To test this idea, we will later on 
distinguish between moves to renting and moves to renting which are not followed by a move 
to ownership shortly after the move. 
 
3. Empirical Models 
3.1 Estimation of odP /dV, rdP /dV and β 
 In this paper we use hazard rate models or - stated differently - duration models to 
estimate the impact of the residence value on residential mobility. The hazard rate is defined 
as the rate at which an event takes place over a short period of time, given that this event has 
not occurred so far (Ginsberg, 1979a; 1979b). All results derived above for the probability to 
move also apply to residential hazard rates. In our empirical application, the time interval dt is 
set to one year. Two types of transitions are explicitly modelled: transitions within the owner 
sector and transitions from ownership to renting. Therefore, the hazard rate to move is 
modelled into two possible ‘competing risks’. Other transitions (such as moves to housing for 
the elderly) are here accounted as incomplete spells. The variable b denotes the index of a 
particular risk (b = “o” or “r”). The hazard rate, θb, measures the probability of leaving a 
residence to state b over a specific (small) time interval [T, T+dt], given that one occupies this 
residence up to T: 
                                                           
7
 Households that move to renting and within a short period back to ownership belong more likely to a group of 
‘forced’ movers. 
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θb = Pr (T < tb < T+dt | all tb  ≥ T ).        (13) 
 
 The competing risks are assumed to have a proportional (or loglinear) structure (see 
e.g. Lancaster, 1990). Thus, the risk into b at time tb can be described as: 
 
θb(tb|X ) = hb(tb)exp[ψbX]         (14)  
      
where hb(t) denotes the baseline hazard, which is a function of the elapsed duration tb, X is a 
matrix representing individual characteristics and ψb is a vector of regression parameters to be 
estimated. We estimate this model using a partial likelihood approach to estimate ψb 
accounting for uncompleted spells (Clark and Dieleman, 1996; Lancaster, 1996). 
 
 
3.2 Estimation of η 
We estimate the relationship between the anticipated value of the future residence and 
the value of the current residence by regressing the value of the next residence, which is 
observed for a selective sample of households, on the current value of the residence and other 
explanatory variables used in the hazard model. In line with the theoretical specification (see 
(4)), we assume a linear model.8 
 
4. Data 
In the present study, we make use of the IPR database. The IPR (Income Panel 
Research) database consists of a sample of about 75000 Dutch households that are followed 
yearly by tax authorities, over the period 1990-1997. In the IPR, a number of possible housing 
states are distinguished. Moving behaviour can be derived from address changes. Housing 
market states consist of rental housing, homeownership, or other types (for example, housing 
for the elderly). From this sample we select households that moved to ownership (16090 
observations) between 1990 and 1996. We follow these households over time from the 
moment of the first move to ownership until the year of the next move. So, we analyse a flow 
sample. For each household, we observe a complete (when the household moves before the 
                                                           
8
 We also estimate this model correcting for sampling bias using the Heckman correction method following Edin 
and Englund (1991). This correction method implies that one first estimates the probability to select an 
observation using a probit model on the whole sample of observations. In the next step, the (inverse) Mill’s ratio 
is included which corrects for the selectivity bias in the selected sample (Maddala, 1983). However, correcting 
for sampling bias generates identical results 
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end 1997) or incomplete spell (when the household does not move before the end of 1997), 
together with various individual characteristics of one adult member of the household (the 
head or the partner) at the beginning of the spell.9 For almost 14 percent of the observations, 
we observe completed spells (a move to renting or to ownership).10  
 Our dependent variable is the duration of the spell distinguishing between moves to 
renting and moves to ownership. Explanatory variables include characteristics of the 
household, such as age, gender, having a partner who earns income, or not. Further, dummies 
are created for the number of persons in a household (one or two persons or more) and 
whether the residence is located in urban areas. Financial indicators are used for household 
income (in logs) and wealth (savings more than 13,636 euro per adult in the household) and 
financial characteristics of the residence: value of the mortgage, value of the residence.11  The 
value of the residence is equal to the WOZ-value, which is the value as described in the Law 
on Property. 12 Regional dummies are used to correct for differences in local housing markets 
(we distinguish 40 regions, so called COROP regions). Finally, yearly dummies are included. 
Note that all financial indicators are real (1990 prices) using the consumer price index 
deflator. Descriptive variables can be found in Table 2. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2 over here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 3A and B over here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Empirical Results 
                                                           
9
 The IPR does contain an usual high proportion of  ‘movers’ within the first year, which are mainly 
administrative corrections in addresses, so moves within the first year are censored. This procedure has also 
another rationale, because households that who move within 6 months after moving to ownership receive full 
reimbursement of the buyer tax which is the main component of the transaction costs. 
10
 Our data indicate that households are about twice as likely to move to renting than to ownership (see Table 2). 
Data based on stock samples for the Netherlands suggest that the probability of moving to renting and the 
probability of moving are about equal (Clarke and Dieleman, 1996). Note that in a flow sample, the elapsed 
duration is much shorter than in stock samples, and that households with short spells are more likely to move to 
renting (see Dieleman et al., 1995). Moreover, many moves to renting are within a short period followed by 
moves to ownership (see 5.3) It is well known that the stock sample procedures tend to underestimate short 
spells.  
11
 One guilder is about one dollar. 
12
 The WOZ-value tends to be slightly lower than the purchase price, implying that our estimates of the effect of 
transaction costs are plausibly slightly higher than reported in the current paper. 
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In this section, we discuss the effect of  transaction costs on residential mobility rates 
in the Netherlands combining information from a competing risks residential hazard model 
(see Table 3) and a regression model of property values of residences (see Table 4). The effect 
of transaction costs on residential mobility is measured by using the estimated effects of the 
value of the residence on the moving rate to ownership and to renting and the relationship 
between the value of the next residence and the current residence. Because the effect of the 
value of the residence on residential mobility plays a fundamental role in the estimation 
procedure, we have experimented with a linear (Table 3A) and a loglinear specification 
(Table 3B) for the value of the residence in the competing risks residential hazard model.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 4 over here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The estimates in Tables 3A and B indicate that the value of the current residence has a 
negative effect on the probability of moving to ownership, but has a less (according to the 
loglinear model) or no (according to the linear model) effect on the probability of moving to 
renting. This can be interpreted as evidence that ad-valorem buyer costs have a strong 
negative effect on the decision to move to ownership, whereas the effect of the seller 
transaction costs is small.13  
It is worthwhile to discuss briefly the effect of the other explanatory variables in 
Tables 3A and B. The results indicate that income of the household has a strong positive 
influence on the likelihood of moving into another owned residence, but has no effect on the 
likelihood of moving into renting.14 We interpret this result as evidence that owning is more 
attractive for high-income households, which may be explained in a number of ways. The 
main reason is plausibly that the Dutch tax regime makes ownership more attractive for high-
                                                           
13
 Ioannides and Kan (1996) find only weak evidence of a negative effect of property value on residential 
mobility in the US suggesting that transaction costs are not proportional to the property value. In the US, total 
transaction costs are much lower than in the Netherlands due to the absence of ad valorem transaction taxes. 
Consequently, the effect of property values on residential mobility to ownership must be much smaller in the US 
than in the Netherlands when we presume that the marginal effect of transaction costs in the US are the same as 
in the Netherlands (see equation 7). Moreover, it seems plausible that the marginal effect of transaction costs on 
residential mobility is lower (in absolute sense) in the US  than in the Netherlands, on average, for example 
because households are risk averse and transaction costs are much higher in the Netherlands. A statistical 
explanation would be that in the current study the number of observations is much larger than in the study of 
Ioannides and Kan (1996).  
 
14
 This result corresponds with the study of Gronberg and Reed (1990), which does not distinguish between 
moves to ownership and renting, which find that household income has a positive effect on residential mobility 
of owners. 
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income households. Moreover, these households are less likely to receive financial assistance 
in the renting market and are less restricted in receiving a mortgage, because of the ability to 
pay for the mortgage prepayment (Quigley, 1987; Pinto, 2002). The latter interpretation is 
consistent with the estimates of the effect of the two wealth variables (wealth dummy, ratio of 
mortgage value to property value), which indicate that wealthy households are more likely to 
move into another owned residence, but less likely to move into renting. Findings of 
Henderson and Ioannides (1987) confirm these results. We find also that persons with an 
employed partner are more likely to move to ownership, confirming the results of Gronberg 
and Reed (1990) for married couples and Ihlanfeldt and Silberman (1985) for two-earner 
households. Females are more likely to move to renting, which is in line with findings of 
Ihlanfeldt and Silberman (1985). Households within urban environments are more likely to 
move residence. High residence values in the region increase mobility to ownership, but not 
to renting. The latter result has many interpretations, and is consistent with the matching 
model of Wheaton (1990) that predicts a positive relationship between the residence values 
and residential mobility.  
The results of the regression of the value of the next residence on the value of the 
current residence, shown in Table 4, indicate that the coefficient associated with current value 
of the residence, previously denoted as η, is equal to 0.58. The estimates imply that 
households that live in residences of low value tend to move to more expensive residences 
space (vertical mobility); households that live in residences of average value tend to move to 
residences of similar value (horizontal mobility), whereas households that live in residences 
of high value   tend to move to cheaper accommodation (end of the career moves). Note that 
the value of the current residence is the most important predictor of the value of the next 
residence justifying equation (4). The effects of other explanatory variables also make sense. 
In line with the residential expenditure literature, income and wealth have positive effects on 
the value of the (next) residence, where as the effect of age is non-monotonic (e.g. Ioannides 
and Rosenthal, 1994; Charlier et al., 2000; 2001). 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 5 over here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Combining the results from Table 3 and 4, we are able to calculate the effect of 
transaction costs on the residential moving rate. One convenient measure is how much a one 
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percent-point increase in the transaction costs (e.g. from 10 to 11 percent, about 870 euros on 
average) increases the (competing risks) residential mobility rate. Given the linear 
specification, oθlog∂ /∂(m/V) = ψ0 V /(β + ηγ) and rθlog∂ /∂(m/V) = ψrV /β. Given the 
loglinear specification, oθlog∂ /∂(m/V) = ψ0 / (β + ηγ) and rθlog∂ /∂(m/V) = ψr / β. 
Presuming that the marginal effects to ownership and renting are the same, the θlog∂ /∂(m/V) 
can be easily derived using (11). In Table 5, the effects of a one percent-point increase in the 
transaction costs on the percentage change in the (competing risk) residential mobility rate 
can be found.15 The different specifications indicate that a one percent point increase in the 
ad-valorem transaction costs rate tend to decrease residential mobility by 8.05 to 12.66%. 
Given the range of specifications, the variation in these estimates is remarkably small. The 
estimates are plausible in the light of international aggregate data on residential mobility and 
transaction costs (see Appendix 1).16 The results from specification 1 suggest that transaction 
costs have a stronger negative effect on moves to renting than to ownership (in line with 
theoretical and empirical studies such as Boehm, 1981, Rosenthal, 1988; Haurin and Grill, 
2002). Nevertheless, the null-hypothesis that the effects on moves to renting and on moves to 
ownership are of equal size cannot be rejected (the mean difference is equal to 3.90% with a 
standard error of 2.48% according to the loglinear specification; given the linear specification 
the effect of transaction costs on moves to renting is not identified, so we cannot test the 
hypothesis). This result is seemingly in contrast to the studies by Boehm (1981), Rosenthal 
(1988) and Haurin and Grill (2002). Note however that these studies are based on mobility 
behavior in the United States, where renters are four times more likely to move than owners. 
In contrast, in the Netherlands, renters are only twice as likely to move (Everaers and Davies, 
1993). Because the expected residence duration difference is much smaller for the 
Netherlands than for the United States, the effect of transaction costs on the choice of tenure 
must also be considerable smaller. This may explain why the difference in the effects on 
moving to renting and to ownership is absent (or too small to detect) in the Netherlands.17 
Hence, given the results from specifications, we can safely employ the assumption that 
oP∂ /∂m= rP∂ /∂m, which justifies the use of specification 2.  
                                                           
15
 The standard errors have been calculated using the delta method, see Goldberger (1991). 
16
 The international data suggest that a percent-point increase in transaction costs decreases residential mobility 
by 8 percent (see Appendix 1). Note that the aggregate data do not allow us to distinguish between moves to 
ownership and to renting, so this estimate is effectively much higher. This estimate is likely an overestimate due 
to the endogeneity of transaction taxes (which are the main component of transaction costs) which are set by the 
national government. 
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Recall that the main advantage of specification 2 is that it does not rely on 
assumptions of β, and enables one to estimate β (given γ). Given the linear specification, the 
estimate of β appears to be 0.061% and not statistically different from zero. This estimate is 
unreasonably low for the Netherlands, as the estate agents costs of selling already amounts to 
(at least) 1.85%. This suggests that the linear model is misspecified. We have therefore used 
an encompassing test that is appropriate to apply to testing non-nested hypotheses (Mizon and 
Richard, 1986). The encompassing test shows that for moves to owning the loglinear model is 
statistically superior to the linear model. The encompassing test implies that the linear and 
loglinear specification of the residence value is included in the model. Using a standard LR-
test, one can than test whether general model (with both specifications) is statistically superior 
to the restricted model (with one specification). In case of moving to owning, the general 
model does not reject the loglinear specification (LR(1) = 0.166, χ2(1) = 3.84), but rejects the 
linear specification (LR(1) =27.89, χ2(1) = 3.85) at the 5 percent level. In case of moving to 
renting, the encompassing test is inconclusive.  Hence, from an economic perspective (β is too 
low) and statistical point of view (the encompassing test), the loglinear model is preferred.  
For the latter model, β is estimated to be equal to 3.7% (standard error 0.5%) using the 
formula in Table 1. Such an estimate is plausible for the Netherlands. Hence, γ/(β+γ) is equal 
to 0.71. Thus, the estimates are consistent with the notion that ad-valorem transaction costs 
mainly consist of costs associated with selling. Furthermore, the results indicate that the total 
ad-valorem transaction costs rate is equal to 12.7% (measured as β + γ), which is close to 
estimates for the Netherlands (OECD, 1999). 
 
5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
 For the loglinear specification, a one percent-point increase in transaction costs decreases 
residential mobility by 8.05% (standard error 1.39%). Although the latter estimate is the most 
reliable estimate (from an economic and statistical view), we emphasize that this result is 
robust with respect to the chosen specification of the residential mobility hazard rate model 
(linear versus loglinear).  Equation (10) indicates however that this estimate may be sensitive 
to the chosen and respectively estimated values of γ and η.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
17
 We will show later on that if we consider only a subset of moves to renting, our results confirm the studies of 
Boehm (1981), Rosenthal (1988) and Haurin and Grill (2002). 
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Let us focus first on γ. We have presumed that γ is equal to 0.09, but its exact value is 
plausibly somewhere between 0.08 and 0.10.18 The implication is that the point estimate may 
vary between -7.15 % and -9.01%. So, the estimate is quite insensitive with respect to the 
chosen value of γ.19  
Second, let us focus on η. This coefficient has been estimated by regressing the value 
of the next residence on the value of the current residence, controlling for a number of 
explanatory variables. Employing a range of specifications, the estimate of 0.58 is insensitive 
to the inclusion of the Heckman correction, which corrects for selective sampling, and other 
explanatory variables. For example, including the Heckman correction, the coefficient is only 
slightly higher and is equal to 0.59. When we include the explanatory variable, η is equal to 
0.56.20  
Further, we have experimented with different functional forms for equation (4). Again 
the results are quite robust. For example, if we specify both the current and the next property 
value in logarithms θ∂ /∂(m/V) is close to -7%. Next, we have experimented whether η 
interacts with age, the idea being that the stage of the lifecycle may determine η. It appears 
that η is constant for all age groups, except for the youngest age category, where η is 
statistically not different from zero. Re-estimating the model excluding the youngest age 
category does not affect any of the conclusions. Finally, we have estimated a range of 
different hazard rate models (e.g., the Weibull model) and models including unobserved 
heterogeneity (using the gamma mixing distribution), but the estimate remains robust.21  
 
5.3 Moves to renting revisited 
Our estimation procedure relies on the distinction between moves to renting and to 
ownership. Due to imperfect information, ‘forced moves’ etc, it is expected that some 
households move to renting for a short period and then move back to owning. One expects 
that these moves are less (or even not) affected by  transaction costs. Our data for the 
Netherlands indicate that 54% of the households, that move to renting, move back to 
                                                           
18
 Recall, in the Netherlands, transaction tax is equal to 6%; estate agent is equal to 1.85%. 
19
 Note further that if we assume that β + γ is equal to 0.12 (the value reported by the OECD, 1999) and we 
estimate γ the results are almost identical to the reported results. 
20
 This result is in line with the housing demand study by Dynarski, 1985, who provides evidence that coefficient 
differences between movers and non movers are small for non-demographic variables. 
21
 In contrast to studies of job mobility, studies of residential mobility for the Netherlands generally find that 
modelling unobserved heterogeneity does not affect the results. In contrast, Kan (2000) indicates that modelling 
unobserved heterogeneity may be useful in the US. 
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ownership within a period of one to seven years. 22 23 A priori, one expects that the effect of 
transaction costs on moving to renting permanently is higher (because it excludes moves 
which are plausibly unrelated to transaction costs). We have re-estimated the residential 
hazard model, the only difference being that observations of households that move to renting 
and back to owning before the end of the observation period are censored at the moment of 
moving to renting. As can be seen from the last column of Table 5, transaction costs have a 
somewhat stronger negative effect on those moving to renting ‘permanently’. Moreover, the 
results indicate that the effect on moving to renting ‘permanently’ is stronger than to 
ownership (in line with empirical studies in the US). In conclusion, in line with theoretical 
considerations, our estimates imply that the marginal effects of transaction costs are higher for 
voluntary residential mobility than for residential mobility in general.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6 over here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this paper we have estimated the effect of transaction costs on 
residential mobility. Our estimates indicate that a one percent-point decrease in transaction 
taxes (as a percentage of the property value) increases mobility to ownership by about 8%. 
For the Netherlands, this estimate implies that abolition of the six percent buyers’ transaction 
tax induces an increase in the residential mobility rate from ownership to ownership by about 
50%. Of course, abolition of transaction tax also effects renters. We can only speculate about 
the effect on renters. Nevertheless, since a large share of renters will not move to owning for 
reasons which are not related to transaction costs, it is likely that the abolition of the buyer tax 
has a smaller effect on the population of renters. As in any microeconomic study, our 
estimates ignore any macroeconomic effects. In the current context, the study by Lundborg 
and Skedinger (1998), which employs a housing market equilibrium search model in the spirit 
of Wheaton (1990), is relevant, since it indicates that a decrease in buyer transaction costs 
increases equilibrium house prices only slightly suggesting that our estimates are robust with 
                                                           
22
 Similarly, in the United States, about 50% of households which move to renting move back to ownership 
within 5 years (Clark and Dieleman, 1996). 
23
 In our data, moves are measured only once a year, so households that move to renting and back to owning 
within a year are treated as moves to owning. 
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respect to major changes in the transaction costs. To what extent our estimates for the 
Netherlands can be generalized to other countries remains open to debate.24 
                                                           
24
 In this respect, the results by Schneider et al. (1985) are not too encouraging. They show that differences in 
estimates of residential mobility determinants between two OECD countries (USA and West Germany) are 
sometimes substantial.     
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Appendix 1 
 
Figure 1  Residential mobility and transaction costs. 
 
 
Source: OECD(1999) and AGV (1995), BE = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FR = France, GER = Germany , NL = 
the Netherlands, UK = United Kingdom 
 
Note: Residential mobility is defined as the number of owners’ moves divided by the number of owners. A 
regression of (the logarithm of) residential mobility on transaction costs gives an 8 percent decrease in 
residential mobility given a one percent-point increase in transaction costs (R2 =0.60; t-value=2.43). 
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Table 1. Marginal effects of transaction costs on moving to ownership and to renting. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1. Assumptions: perfect foresight; β, η and γ are known. 
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Table 2. Description of variables.  
   
 Mean Standard Deviation  
Duration in years (including incomplete spells) 4.3007 2.11 
Move to ownership 0.047 0.21 
Move to the renting 0.11 0.31 
Female 0.50 0.50 
Working partner 0.48 0.50 
One-person household 0.12 0.33 
Two person household 0.44 0.47 
Less than 25 years of age 0.12 0.33 
25-35 years of age 0.35 0.48 
35-45 years of age 0.22 0.42 
45-55 years of age 0.15 0.36 
Savings dummy 0.06 0.236 
Household income (in logarithm) 9.99 0.46 
Value of mortgage as a share of the value of the residence 0.58 0.45 
Value of residence (in 100,000 euros) 0.87 0.53 
Value of next residence (in 100,000 euros)  0.96 0.59 
Urban environment 0.33 0.47 
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Table 3A. Competing risks residential mobility hazard model: moves to renting and 
ownership 
 Estimates Std. error Estimates Std. error 
 Moves to renting  Moves to ownership 
Value of residence 
-0.1078 0.0616 -0.8426* 0.1034 
Less than 25 years  
 0.019 0.104 -0.003 0.163 
25-35 years  
-0.068 0.087  0.011 0.132 
35-45 years  
  0.093 0.089  0.002 0.138 
45-55 years  
  0.099 0.088  0.139 0.133 
Female 
  0.293* 0.050  0.134 0.075 
Working partner 
 -0.257* 0.059 -0.096 0.089 
One-person household 
  -0.023 0.087 -0.100 0.140 
Two person household 
  -0.052 0.059 -0.111 0.088 
Savings dummy 
   0.006 0.104  0.312 0.148 
Household income in 
logs 
 -0.070 0.061  0.430 0.101 
Urban environment 
 0.122* 0.057  0.257* 0.085 
Value of the mortgage/ 
value of the residence 
-0.362* 0.064 -0.284* 0.095 
Regional dummies (40) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (6) Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 16090  16090  
Log likelihood 
-15847.90  -6937.06  
*) significant at the 1%-
level 
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Table 3B. Competing risks residential mobility hazard model: moves to renting and 
ownership 
 Estimates Std. error Estimates Std. error 
 Moves to renting Moves to ownership 
Value of residence in 
logs 
-0.305 0.047 -0.726* 0.067 
Less than 25 years  0.013 0.104 -0.017 0.163 
25-35 years  
-0.045 0.087  0.027 0.132 
35-45 years  0.130 0.089  0.010 0.138 
45-55 years  0.121 0.088  0.143 0.133 
Female 
  0.294* 0.050  0.139 0.075 
Working partner 
 -0.242* 0.060 -0.072 0.089 
One-person household 
-0.027 0.088 -0.131 0.140 
Two person household 
-0.031 0.059 -0.103 0.087 
Savings dummy 0.049 0.104    0.330* 0.148 
Household income in 
logs 
0.015 0.062   0.447* 0.099 
Urban environment 
 0.088 0.058    0.227* 0.086 
Value of the mortgage/ 
value of the residence 
-0.361* 0.064  -0.225* 0.094 
Regional dummies (40) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (6) Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 16090  16090  
Log likelihood 
-16092.11  -6923.15  
*) significant at the 1%-
level 
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Table 4 Estimation of relationship between value of current and next residence 
 
 Estimates Std. error 
Explanatory variable    
Value of residence     0.58* 0.07 
Less than 25 years   0.11 0.13 
25-35 years     0.33* 0.10 
35-45 years     0.38* 0.10 
45-55 years   0.12 0.10 
Female  0.11 0.06 
Working partner -0.12 0.07 
One-person household  0.21 0.11 
Two person household -0.02 0.07 
Savings dummy    0.33* 0.12 
Real household income in log    0.34* 0.07 
Urban environment -0.02 0.07 
Value of the mortgage/ value of 
the residence 
-0.10 0.07 
Regional dummies (40) Yes  
Year dummies (6) Yes  
   
Number of observations 679  
R2 0.345  
* significant at the 1%-level   
   
Note: Dependent variable is the value of the next residence; the values of current and next residence are in 
100000 euros. 
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Table 5. The effect of a one percent-point increase in the transaction costs on the 
percentage change in the (competing risks) residential mobility rate. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 Specification 1 (β=0.03; γ=0.09) 
     
 Move to ownership Move to renting  Move to 
‘permanent’ renting 
linear -8.36     -  -12.04 
 (1.77)   (3.21) 
loglinear -8.76 -12.66  -21.10 
 (1.24)   (2.04)  (3.03) 
     
Specification 2 (γ=0.09)                                                                           estimated     β 
     
linear -11.44 -11.44  0.00061  
 (1.29) (1.29) (0.00045)  
loglinear -8.05 -8.05  0.037  
 (1.39) (1.39) (0.005)  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: standard error in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method (e.g., Goldberger, 
1991). The effects based on the linear model are evaluated at the mean property value. 
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Table 6. Residential mobility hazard model: permanent moves to renting.  
 Estimates Std. error Estimates Std. error 
 Moves to renting Moves to renting 
Value of residence 
-0.385* 0.0935 -  
Value of residence in 
logs 
-   -0.500* 0.069 
Less than 25 years  
  0.088 0.142 0.081 0.142 
25-35 years  
-0.169 0.127 -0.143 0.127 
35-45 years  
-0.187 0.137 -0.152 0.136 
45-55 years  
-0.174 0.136 -0.157 0.136 
Female 
    0.366* 0.075    0.370* 0.075 
Working partner 
  -0.235* 0.091   -0.212* 0.091 
One-person household 
-0.018 0.125 -0.036 0.126 
Two person household 
-0.024 0.090 -0.007 0.089 
Savings dummy 
-0.262 0.179 -0.221 0.179 
Household income in 
logs 
  -0.359* 0.081   -0.301* 0.084 
Urban environment 
    0.239* 0.086    0.196* 0.086 
Value of the mortgage/ 
value of the residence 
   -0.330* 0.095   -0.308* 0.094 
Regional dummies (40) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (6) Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 16090  16090  
Log likelihood 
-7033.79  -7017.31  
*) significant at the 1%-
level 
    
 
 
 
